18 February 2006

missing the point

Lisbeth Gronlund, Co-Director of the Global Security Program, recently sent this letter to the editors of the Washington Post:

`In their Jan. 30 op-ed, "A Plan for Nuclear Waste," [link] John Deutch and Ernest J. Moniz made a strong case against a U.S. reprocessing program to extract plutonium from spent nuclear reactor fuel, noting that it would undercut efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons to more nations.

It did not mention that reprocessing also would entail a risk of terrorists acquiring the material needed to make a nuclear weapon.

Because U.S. nuclear power plants now pose no such risk, reprocessing would be a big step in the wrong direction -- especially for an administration that claims that preventing nuclear terrorism is a priority.

The point that Ms. Gronlund, Mr. Deutch and Mr. Moniz all failed to realize, or at a minumum failed to explain, is that a US policy towards reprocessing spent nuclear fuels from across the world is being considered because of the threat of acquisition of spent nuclear fuels by rogue nations, terrorists, terrorist sympathizers and/or supporters. In late 2001, against a backdrop worldwide protest, Russia approved measures allowing the import and export of spent nuclear fuels. They have indicated their intent to provide Iran with the fuel needed to operate its facilities, and to import and reprocess its spent nuclear fuels. Further, Russia has been a supporter of North Korea's aims to build 2 additional light-water reactors. By involving itself in this market, the United States will gain a greater understanding of the nature and intentions of those already trafficking these dangerous materials. The current spent nuclear fuels market is not fully transparent to the American intelligence community, and while the public may perceive our involvement in this process as dangerous, they will certainly understand that on a global scale this market already exists. I'm sure the American public would agree; It is a far more attractive proposition for the US to purchase and reprocess these materials than it is for us to allow nations who lack the integrity, security and technology to prevent terrorists from acquiring them. Ms. Gronlund is concerned about terrorists acquiring these materials. So are we, and that's (in no small part) why this controversial idea has been proposed.

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